Abstract: This paper examines the impact of capital income taxation on the composition of foreign portfolio investment. Examining a sample of 39 developed and developing countries over the period 2001 to 2015, we find that capital gains and dividend taxation reduce the share of equities on foreign portfolios, while interest taxation increases this share. To the extent that equity commands a higher return than debt investments that accumulates over time, our findings indicate that domestic tax decisions have long-term implications for a country's external wealth.
Introduction
A nation's external wealth is not only determined by how much it saves or borrows vis-avis other countries over time. An equally important factor is how the savings are invested. Asset classes differ widely in their expected returns, with equity investment providing significantly higher returns than debt investment.
2 As return differences are compounded over time, the long run consequences of the composition of a country's foreign investment portfolio are large. A point in case are the United States. Due to long-standing current account deficits, the United States are by far the largest indebted country of the world. However, at the same time, the net investment income (the difference between capital income earned abroad and paid to foreigners) is consistently positive and large. As a result, the net debt of the USA has grown at a much smaller rate than the cumulative current deficits. It stands at only around 70% of the cumulative current account deficits (Boonstra, 2017) . This is very surprising since, because of compounding interest, it should be much larger than the sum of the deficits. While several factors account for these differences, an important one is the composition of assets and liabilities in terms of equity and debt:
Debt positions are only a small part of the assets of the United States but their liabilities are largely comprised of debt.
Taxation of capital income, set by respective domestic governments, has a potentially important effect on the foreign positions of their households. In many countries, taxation on debt and equity differ, with equity often being taxed more lightly than debt income. Differential taxation has obvious implications for household's incentives to accumulate foreign positions in either asset class. Everything else being equal, higher taxation of, say equity income, makes investment in equity less attractive relative to debt. This may lead to a shift in foreign positions away from equity into debt. This, in turn, may potentially have significant negative long-term repercussions for domestic wealth due to return differences among the two asset classes. 3 Besides relative taxation of equity and debt, the absolute level of taxation may also matter for foreign investment. For example, if investment in foreign equity effectively incurs a cost (for example, to overcome informational asymmetries present when investing another country), a sufficiently high domestic tax rate may deter overall foreign investments. This may have welfare consequences as it reduces international diversification and intensifies the home bias.
In this paper we study how domestic capital income taxation affects the foreign asset positions of households. 4 For this we use data on cross-border portfolio investments from the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) for a sample of 39 developed countries over the period 2001 to 2015. Specifically, we relate domestic taxation on the income from equity (capital gains and dividends) and debt (interest) to the foreign portfolio positions of households. We focus on bilateral holdings vis-a-vis all other countries in our data, instead of the total foreign positions of domestic households. Considering bilateral positions has the advantage that we can control for a wide array of factors that may affect foreign positions, unrelated to taxation. It also allows exploiting heterogeneity across country-pairs arising from the fact that tax sensitivities are likely to vary at the bilateral level, alleviating endogeneity concerns.
In our main regressions we relate the equity share, the proportion of equity investments in the foreign positions, to various domestic tax rates. We find that taxation of dividends and capital gains each significantly reduces the equity share, while taxation of interest income increases the 3 Note that higher wealth accumulation arising from more equity investment does not necessarily equate to welfare gains for investors when the larger return is a compensation for risk. 4 Domestic taxation may also affect the positions of foreigners in domestic assets. For example, if domestic equity returns are highly taxed, domestic households may sell domestic equity to foreigners as part of a rebalancing towards more debt. equity share. These results are consistent with the expectation that households consider the differing tax implications of investments when deciding on their foreign portfolio allocations, that is, after-tax returns matter for portfolio choices. The results are robust across a range of different specification of the tax rates, in particular, they are similar when we take into account of the fact that foreign income may be subject to additional taxation such as from withholding taxes, and when we assume that investors base decisions on tax yields instead of (statutory) tax rates. To provide an idea of the estimated magnitudes, a one-standard deviation variation in each of the three tax rates changes the equity share in the range of 1 to 2.1 percentage points.
5 While this appears modest if seen in a static context, we demonstrate that there are potentially significant consequences for accumulated wealth as small return differences compound over time.
The results beg the question of what drives the adjustments in the equity share. Is it a pure substitution effect where following higher taxation of one asset class households shift into the other asset class, leaving total foreign positions unchanged? Or does higher taxation of one asset class predominantly lead to a reduction in this asset class, and hence reduces overall foreign asset holdings? To investigate, we split the equity share into its two components, the amount of foreign equity and the amount of foreign debt, and study how they are affected by taxation. We find that the results vary with the specific tax considered; however, for changes in the relative taxation of equity (defined as the simple average of dividend and capital gains taxation minus interest rate taxation) the coefficients on the equity and debt positions cancel out, pointing towards a pure substitution effect.
5 As the estimates are obtained based on the total foreign positions of the country (thus including tax-exempt institutions) they are already net of potential clientele effects where taxable investors sell to tax-exempt ones.
The question of how domestic taxation affects portfolio positions is ripe with identification challenges. Governments may, for example, vary tax rates during booms and busts, when the equity share is likely to vary as well. Or, governments may react specifically to the portfolio composition of their households, for example, they may lower equity taxation in order to encourage households to start investing in equity. Endogeneity concerns are arguably more limited
in our context as we analyze the foreign equity share (in total foreign portfolio investment), which is generally not of concern for domestic policy decisions correlated with domestic taxation (and our fixed effects absorb global shocks to the equity share). In addition, the focus on bilateral positions allows controlling for a wide range of factors, in particular any supply side shock by accounting for year fixed effects per destination country, and bilateral fixed effects. It also allows us to exploit heterogeneities in our analysis. Bilateral sensitivities to changes in taxation are expected to differ between country pairs. For example, familiarity with a country means that investors develop preferences for (or against) investing in this country, making investment decisions stickier and hence less responsive to taxation. We thus exploit (postulated) differences in tax sensitivities for identification. Specifically, following a (potential endogenous) variation in domestic tax rates, the foreign equity share vis-a-vis countries with higher tax sensitivities should react more than the one vis-a-vis countries with lower tax sensitivity. Consistent with this we find that the equity share reacts significantly less in response to tax changes in the case of countries that should be more familiar for domestic households, as proxied by the number of bilateral visits or the amount of bilateral trade.
Our paper connects two strands of literature. The first strand has tried to understand what drives international capital flows, and more closely related to our setting, the resulting external positions of countries. In a series of papers, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, number of developing and developed countries. Focusing on portfolio and direct investment jointly, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001) , in particular, show that a country's foreign equity-ratio is positively related to the openness of a country and the country size. 6 Focusing on dividend taxes, Amiram and Frank (2016) find that inward foreign portfolio investment in equity substitutes for domestic investors as domestic dividend taxes increase. Desai and Dharmapala (2011) show that U.S. portfolio investment in foreign equity increases more strongly in countries with a tax treaty than in countries without a treaty reflecting that investments in the latter group do not benefit from the dividend tax cut in the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003. Relying on an extensive international panel data set of taxes on dividends as well as on capital gains and interest allows us to extend this literature by considering the choice between fixed income and equity investments while also controlling for any potentially confounding effect -global or local -from the supply side.
The second strand is on how taxation affects investor portfolios in a domestic setting. This literature has predominantly considered the cross-sectional aspect of taxation, i.e., it has studied how assets are allocated among heterogeneous agents that differ in terms of their tax status regarding different asset classes. Theory predicts that if all assets are riskless (or, more generally, when assets are complete substitutes in absence of taxation), strict clienteles will emerge where each set of investors invests in the asset classes that are taxed most favorable for them (Auerbach and King, 1983) . When allowing for investor heterogeneity and differential taxation of ordinary income, a modified CAPM emerges where investors combine the market portfolio with a portfolio 6 While we focus on the asset side, a significant part of the literature has also analyzed the balance sheet of a country in terms of liabilities, arguing that higher reliance on debt finance may cause vulnerability while higher equity-based financing promotes international risk sharing (Rogoff, 1999; Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2001b ).
consisting of assets for which the investor is taxed lightly relative to other investors (Auerbach and King, 1983) .
Several empirical studies have confirmed the predictions of theory. Feldstein (1976) finds that equity --which in the U.S. is less heavily taxed than interest rate income --is more predominantly held by high-income households, which face higher marginal tax rates. King and Leape (1998) find that marginal tax rates affect the set of assets investors hold, but they find very little evidence that taxation also affects the fraction of household wealth held in the respective asset classes. Poterba and Samwick (2002) show that the likelihood of an investor holding taxadvantaged assets is positively related to its tax rate on ordinary income. Poterba and Samwick also find that the equity share declines in a household's income tax rate. Exploiting withinhousehold variation of taxation in Canada, Alan et al (2010) find evidence for household portfolio shares varying consistent with investors seeking out respectively lower-tax asset classes.
Our study differs from those in several dimensions. First, we focus on how taxation affects the foreign asset holdings of investors, whereas the literature has focused on the domestic holdings of investors. 7 Second, we exploit variation in tax rates over time and across countries, rather than within-country variation in tax rates. This is consistent with the policy question of how taxation affects external wealth. Third, we study the effect of taxation on the entire portfolio holdings of a country, which includes both tax-exempt investors and also takes into account clientele effects.
8
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains our empirical approach. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 contains the empirical results. The final section offers conclusions.
Empirical approach
The purpose of this study is to investigate how shareholder taxation affects the allocation of foreign portfolios holdings between debt and equity. We examine investments in debt and equity separately, and also the share of equity investments in total portfolio investments. Specifically, let be the share of equity investments in total portfolio investments in country j owned by investors resident in country with ≠ . We relate the equity share to the taxation of the returns to debt and equity investments that are applicable for a private investor that is a resident of country i given that institutional investors such as pension funds tend to be tax exempt. Generally, the applicable shareholder taxation consists of residence-based income taxation in the investor's country i as well as of the nonresident withholding taxation of dividends and interest in the foreignsource country j. In the empirical work, we first consider residence-based taxation. Subsequently, we consider residence-based taxation and foreign-source withholding taxation jointly.
In the empirical work, we relate the foreign portfolio equity share to shareholdercountry tax rates as follows:
in which is a residence-based capital income tax rate. Alternatively, the tax rate is the capital gains tax rate, , the tax rate on dividend income, , or the interest income tax rate, . We expect the equity share to be negatively related to the capital gains and dividend tax rate, and positively to the interest tax rate. Further, X it it is a vector of controls at the level of the residence country that could affect the foreign portfolio equity share including several macroeconomic and institutional variables. In specification (1), we include bilateral fixed effects that capture potential time-invariant bilateral determinants of cross-border portfolio investments such as the bilateral correlation of stock market returns and potential informational frictions that affect crossborder portfolio investments. In addition, are (time-variant) foreign-source country fixed effects that among other things could reflect variation in the supply of foreign assets as well as the corresponding expected pre-tax returns on these assets. Hence, this cancels out any -global or local -confounding effect from the supply side which alternative approaches to identification may suffer from.
In our analysis, we take the outstanding amounts of investable assets around the world as exogenously given, as cross-border portfolio investment from a particular investor country is small relative to worldwide asset demand and supply. For this reason, the estimated sensitivity of the equity share to taxation, as reflected in the parameter γ, isolates the effect of taxation on asset allocation for given asset supplies.
The sensitivity of cross-border portfolio investment potentially depends on how familiar prospective investors are with a particular foreign country. In particular, more familiarity could reduce the impact of taxation, as the availability of additional information beyond tax rates reduces the relative importance of the available tax information. To test this, we estimate the following model
in which is an index of the intensity of bilateral contact between countries i and j. Alternatively, we represent bilateral contact by bilateral tourists visits, , and by bilateral trade, . For the various tax rates, we expect to find estimates of 1 and 2 of different signs consistent with the notion that investor familiarity with a foreign country reduces the sensitivity of portfolio investment in this country with respect to taxation.
Data
We obtain information on cross-border portfolio investments from the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) conducted by the IMF. Participating countries report annually on their holdings of portfolio investment securities including equity and investment fund shares, long-term debt instruments, and short-term debt instruments. This information is collected on the ownership side rather than at the level of the security issuing country. This should lead to relatively high-quality data, as investors generally know the composition of their portfolios relatively well.
In principle, countries report their foreign portfolio holdings for a range of domestic sectors including households and the financial sector. 9 However, disaggregate sectoral reporting in practice is very incomplete. For this reason, we consider foreign portfolio allocation at the level of the investor country. In practice, we observe a small number of negative values for bilateral portfolio holdings due to short positions. In our analysis, we discard observations with negative values. Table 1 reports the average amount in US$ of foreign equity and debt investment by investor country in the sample. The US is seen to be the largest foreign portfolio investor in that year, with foreign equity holdings of $4.1 trillion and foreign debt holdings of $1.8 trillion.
Somewhat surprisingly, Luxembourg is the second-largest portfolio investor, with equity and debt holdings of $1 trillion and $1.3 trillion, respectively. These large foreign asset holdings by Luxembourg reflect its large asset fund industry as accommodated by its favorable tax regime, which implies that the ultimate owners of these assets often are investors residing outside Luxembourg. In a robustness check, we exclude tax haven countries, as these countries' residencebased income taxation may not be applicable to the ultimate owners of assets that are intermediated by the tax havens. Bulgaria have rather low average equity percentages of 8.7%, 13.4%, and 13.5%, respectively.
These data along with consistently higher returns on equity investments than on debt investments imply that countries greatly differ in the returns that they achieve on their foreign portfolio investments.
In the empirical work, we relate the bilateral equity investment share, , as well as the underlying equity and debt investment amounts, denoted Equity and Debt, to tax variables and other determinants over the 2001-2015 period. As seen in Table 2 , the average bilateral equity share in our sample is 42.3%, while the average amounts of foreign equity and debt investment held in an individual issuer country are $4.6 billion and $5.5 billion, respectively.
To the investor the returns to equity come in the form of capital gains and dividend income subject to tax rates and , respectively. In this study, we consider capital gains and dividend taxes applicable to nonsubstantial, long-term stock investments held by private investors. In line with prior research, we focus on wealthy individuals and thus consider top statutory rates. The average capital gains and dividend tax rates in the sample are 14.0% and 26.7%, respectively. The return to debt accrues in the form of interest which is subject to an interest income tax, . The average interest income tax is 26.5%. To reflect the relative taxation of the returns to equity and debt, we define the tax rate difference variable Δ as the average of the capital gains and dividend tax rates minus the interest tax rate, i.e. Δ = 1 2 + 1 2 − . The average tax rate difference variable is -6.2%, which implies that on average the return to equity is taxed less heavily than interest income.
In addition to investor-country taxation, the returns on bilateral portfolio investments can be subject to taxation in the foreign-source country in the form of nonresident dividend and interest withholding taxes denoted and , respectively. These nonresident withholding tax rates are generally creditable against personal income taxation in the residence country up to the level of the corresponding dividend and interest income tax rates. This implies that nonresident dividend and interest withholding taxes only add to the effective taxation of cross border dividend and interest income streams to the extent that this foreign-source taxation exceeds the pertinent taxation in the residence country. The effective, combined international tax rate on, say, dividend income, then is the maximum of the dividend income tax rate in the residence country and the nonresident interest income tax rate in the foreign-source country. Generally, the effective tax rates on cross border dividend and interest income from country i to country j can be written as follows
The average effective dividend and interest income taxes, and , are 28.3%
and 27.9%, respectively. The relative effective taxation of the returns to equity, Δ , is computed as
and has a mean of -6.8%.
In some specifications, we relate foreign portfolio variables to tax yields, computed as tax rates times estimates of the average historical returns to which the tax rates apply. For example, the capital gains tax yield, , is defined as the capital gains tax rate times the capital gains return , i.e. = × where is computed from MSCI country indices.
Similarly, the dividend tax yield, , is computed as × where is the dividend yield computed from MSCI country indices.
To compute and , we use the monthly gross stock return index, , , . These figures are then annualized to arrive at and ,
respectively.
10 Average values for the resulting capital gains and the dividend tax yields, and , are 0.5% and 0.7%, respectively.
Analogously, we define the interest tax yield, , as the product of the capital gains tax rate, , and the interest income yield, , which we approximate by the yield on 10-year government bonds reported by the IMF. The average interest tax yield, , is 1.3%. The differential equity-debt tax yield, Δ , defined as To test how investor familiarity with a foreign country affects the sensitivity of foreign portfolio investment to taxation, we use two proxies of cross-border investor familiarity. First, Visits is the share of bilateral visits between a pair of countries in the total visits by foreigners to the two countries, with a mean of 3.0%. Second, Trade is the percent of total exports and imports of two countries that flow between these two countries, with a mean of 0.3.
Empirical results
In this section we present evidence on the relations between the foreign equity share and the underlying equity and debt investments on the one hand, and capital income tax rates and yields on the other hand. Specifically, section 4.1 considers how the equity share varies with residencecountry capital income tax rate and yields, and with effective capital income tax rates and yields incorporating nonresident withholding taxation. In Section 4.2 we consider several extensions to the basic econometric model.
Main Results
To start, Table 3 examines the relation between the equity share and personal income tax rates in the residence country. In regression 1, the capital gains tax rate is estimated with a negative coefficient of -0.226 that is significant at the 1% level. Thus, an increase in the capital gains tax rate by 1 percentage point is estimated to reduce the equity share by 0.226 percent. In regression 2, the dividend tax receives a negative coefficient of -0.085 that is significant at 5%, suggesting that a higher dividend tax reduces the equity share in international portfolio investment. In contrast, in regression 3 the coefficient for the interest income tax is positive at 0.093 and significant at 5%, implying that higher interest income taxation encourages cross-border equity investment relative to fixed income assets. In regression 4, we jointly include the three tax rates, yielding results that are similar to regressions 1-3. Regression 5 includes the differential equity-debt tax rate, which obtains a negative coefficient of -0.150 that is significant at 1%. This result suggests that the foreign equity share declines with the taxation of the returns to equity relative to debt.
Next, we include a set of controls in regressions 1-5 of Table 3 , and report the results as regressions 6-10. The tax rate variables in regressions 6-10 are estimated with very similar coefficients. In particular, in regression 9, the capital gains tax and dividend tax rate variables are estimated with negative and significant coefficients, while the interest tax variable is estimated with a positive and significant coefficient. In these regressions, GDP per capita enters with a positive and significant coefficient, as the residents of wealthier countries may prefer to hold relatively more equity. The estimated coefficient for the Stock market growth variable is negative and significant, consistent with the notion that higher domestic stock market returns lead investors to hold less foreign equity, resulting in a lower equity share. The interest rate variable has a positive and significant coefficient, as higher domestic interest rates may make investors prefer domestic debt over foreign one, thus increasing the (foreign) equity share. The equity share is positively and significantly related to government efficiency. This could reflect that more efficient governments are better able to enforce the domestic taxation of foreign-source investment income, which could increase the taxation of foreign debt instruments relatively to foreign equity. The elderly share receives a positive coefficient that is significant at 10% in regression 6, and it is insignificant in regressions 7-10. The corporate income tax rate is estimated with a positive coefficient that is significant at 10% in regression 6, and it is insignificant in other regressions.
The results of Table 3 imply that personal income taxation in the residence country has an economically significant effect on the foreign portfolio equity share. In particular, the estimated coefficient of -0.155 for the capital gains tax variable in regression 9 implies that a one standard deviation increase in this tax reduces the equity share by 2.10, equivalent to 5.38% of its standard deviation. Further, the estimated coefficient of -0.071 for the dividend tax variable implies that a one standard deviation increase in the dividend tax reduces the equity percentage by 1 percentage point, equivalent to 2.56% of its standard deviation. Finally, the coefficient estimate of 0.103 for the interest tax variable implies that a one standard deviation increase in the interest tax increases the equity share by 1.61 or 4.10% of its standard deviation.
Next, we examine the empirical relation between the equity share and effective capital income tax rates that are inclusive of nonresident withholding taxation in the foreign-source country. In particular, we reestimate regressions 2-5 and 7-10 of Table 3 replacing the residence-based tax rates by the corresponding effective tax rates that also reflect nonresident withholding taxation.
We present the results in Table 4 . Overall, these results are very similar to those in Table 3 . This no doubt reflects that in many instances nonresident dividend and interest withholding taxes are less than the corresponding personal income taxes in the residence country. The creditability of nonresident withholding taxes then implies that the personal income tax rates in the residence country often are identical to the effective tax rates. In this scenario, nonresident withholding taxes do not affect the taxation of foreign portfolio income from the investor's perspective, although they could engender a redistribution of tax revenue from the residence country towards the foreignsource country.
Next, we relate the equity share to tax yields rather than tax rates. Table 5 shows the results of regressions that include tax yield variables but are otherwise analogous to Table 3 . Regressions 1 and 2 include capital gains tax yield and dividend tax yield variables, respectively, that obtain negative and significant coefficients, while in regression 3 the interest tax yield variable obtains a positive and significant coefficient. Thus, higher capital gains and dividend tax yields discourage foreign equity investments relative to debt investments, while a higher interest tax yield encourages foreign equity holdings relative to debt holdings. Regression 4 jointly includes the three tax yield variables with similar results. In regression 5, the relative tax yield variable is estimated with a negative and significant coefficient, indicating that higher capital gains and dividend tax yields relative to the interest tax yield reduce the equity share in asset allocation.
Regressions 6 to 10 of Table 5 include the same set of control variables as the corresponding regressions of Table 3 . In regression 7, the dividend yield variable is estimated to be insignificant unlike in the corresponding regression 2. Otherwise, estimated coefficients in regressions 6 and 8-10 are similar to those in regressions 1 and 3-5.
Estimated coefficients in regression 9 suggest that tax yields have a material effect on asset allocation. The estimated coefficient for the capital gains tax yield in this regression suggests that a one standard deviation increase in the capital gains tax yield is associated with a reduction in the equity share of 1.29, which is 3.17% of its standard deviation. Further, a one standard deviation increase in the dividend tax yield is associated with a reduction in the equity share of 1.32, which amounts to 3.38% of it standard deviation. Finally, a one standard deviation increase in the interest tax yield is associated with an increase in the equity share of 2.86, or 5.74% of its standard deviation. Table 6 shows results of regressions that relate the equity share to tax yields inclusive of the tax burden represented by nonresident withholding taxes. Otherwise, the regressions are analogous to those in Table 5 . In regression 6, the dividend tax yield inclusive of withholding taxes is estimated to be statistically insignificant, while the corresponding interest tax yield is positive and significant in regression 7. Otherwise, the results in Table 6 are very similar to those in Table 5 .
Long-term implications for external wealth
In this section we examine how a change in the relative taxation of equity affects the external wealth of domestic investors. The idea is that if higher taxation of equity leads to lower holdings of equity, and equity provides higher returns, this ultimately results in lower expected wealth.
We consider a domestic investor who makes a lump-sum investment of 100.000 USD into foreign assets that he holds over 30 years, for example, to (partly) finance his retirement. We analyze how the investor's final wealth will be affected by a change in the relative taxation of equity. In our analysis, we assume that the investor rebalances his portfolio every period to keep the equity share constant and we focus on pre-tax wealth.
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Using the long-run (world) returns on equity and debt ( = + =5.2% and =2.0%, source: Dimson, Marsh and Staunton, 2018), we obtain a blended portfolio return of 3.34% for the mean equity share ( =42%) in the sample. This translated into a final wealth of $268.261. Now consider how this number will change following a one-standard deviation increases in the relative taxation of equity. Given the point estimate of -0.138 on the tax difference in Column 10 of Table   3 , a one-standard deviation change reduces the mean equity share to 40.35% (=42%−0.138×11.96), resulting in a new blended portfolio return of 3.29%. The resulting wealth is now $264,180, $4.080 lower than before (a 1.52% decline).
Extensions
In Table 7 we split the equity share into its two components, equity and debt. This is interesting for two reasons. First, it may inform us about which part of the foreign investment is more sensitive to a certain tax change. Second, it tells us about how a change in the equity share is brought about. In principle, we can think of two polar cases. An increase in the tax on equity, for example, could lead to a reduction in foreign equity while leaving foreign debt unaffected, thus lowering foreign investment ("retrenchment case"). Or, the money freed from selling foreign equity is used to buy foreign debt, leaving total foreign investment unaffected ("substitution case").
Regressions 1 to 5 report the results for the baseline regressions (Table 3 , Regressions 6 to 10) using the log of foreign Equity holdings as dependent variable, while in Regressions 6 to 10 the dependent variable is the log of Debt. The coefficient on the capital gains tax rate in Regression 1 (equity) obtains a coefficient of -0.021 (significant at the 1% level), while the coefficient in Regression 6 (debt) is insignificant and is estimated to be 0.000. In the case of capital gains taxation, the adjustment in response to changes thus exclusively takes place through equity ("retrenchment").
As for the dividend tax, the respective coefficients for equity and debt are 0.004 and 0.01 (significant at 10% and 1% level, respectively). In this case, a larger part of the adjustment takes place through debt levels (as 0.01>0.004), but the difference is insignificant. The respective coefficients for the interest tax are 0.003 (insignificant) and -0.007 (significant at the 1% level),
suggesting that the majority of the adjustment takes place through debt. Regressions 4 and 8 report the results for all tax terms combined, with result similar to the regressions where tax terms are considered in isolation. In Regression 5 and 10 we consider the tax difference. For the case of the equity amount, the coefficient is -0.007, whereas for the debt amount the coefficient is 0.008 (both significant at the 1% level). It is interesting to note that the coefficients are of almost equal magnitude (in absolute terms). This means that changes in the tax difference lead to nearly offsetting changes in equity and debt position, suggesting that the total level of foreign investment (equity plus debt) may be largely unaffected ("substitution"). Table 8 present regression results using the benchmark specification with a sample that excludes the years of the financial crisis (2008) (2009) ). The results are remarkably similar. The coefficient on the tax difference is -0.148 when the dependent variable is the equity share (-0.150 in the benchmark regression of Table 3 ), -0.008 when the dependent variable is the (log of) equity (-0.007 in the corresponding regression in Table 7 ) and 0.008 when the dependent variable is the (log of) debt (same as in Table 7 ).
In Table 9 we exclude tax havens, using the list of tax havens provided in Hines & Rice (1994) . The coefficient on the tax difference in the regression with the equity share is now -0.152 and thus very similar to the full sample, whereas it is -0.009 in the regression with the log of equity (slightly higher in absolute terms than in the benchmark) and 0.005 in the regression with the log of debt (lower than in the benchmark). These regressions provide us some comfort that our results are not driven by the presence of tax havens, in which the identity of immediate and ultimate owners may reasonably be expected to differ.
In Table 10 and Table 11 we examine how "familiarity" affects tax sensitivities. Table 10 considers first the case of bilateral visits between the owner and the issuer-country. In Regression 1 and 2, the interaction effect of the tax rate with bilateral visits is estimated to be insignificant. In Regression 3 (interest rate tax) the interaction effect is estimated at -0.003 (significant at the 1% level). Thus familiarity attenuates the (positive) influence of the interest rate tax on the equity share, as hypothesized. In Regression 5 the interaction effect with the tax different is estimated at 0.004 (significant at the 1% level). Thus, in this case familiarity, as proxied by the bilateral visits, also reduces the impact of taxation. The interaction effects when the dependent variable is the log of equity are all insignificant (Regression 6 to 10), while the interaction effects with debt are significant in the case of the tax difference (Regression 15). Thus, any attenuating influence of familiarity seems to take place through debt, consistent with the notion that debt investors are riskaverse and hence familiarity is more important to them.
In Table 11 we consider trade instead of bilateral visits. In all cases the interaction terms are insignificant, except in the case of the regression of the log of debt on the tax difference. The coefficient in this regression is -0.002 (significant at 5% level). The results are consistent with Table 10 insofar that any attenuating effect of familiarity takes place through the debt channel as opposed through adjustments in equity.
Conclusion
In this paper we have studied how taxation of different forms of capital income affects the composition of a country's external asset portfolio. We have considered a large sample of 39 developed and developing countries over the period 2001 to 2015 and have focused on bilateral portfolio positions, rather than aggregate ones. The main findings are as follows. First, taxation of capital gains and dividends reduces the equity share in portfolios, but taxation of interest rate income increases it, consistent with theoretical priors. Second, the magnitude of the tax elasticities differs according to which form of capital income is taxed. Third, in the case of changes in the relative taxation of equity versus debt, the equity share adjusts through a substitution effect avenue through which domestic tax policies affect the wealth of a country, by influencing the type of foreign assets households invest in, and consequently which returns they earn on capital invested abroad. Difference between the equally weighted sum of the equity tax rates ( , ) and the capital gains tax yield and the interest tax rate ( ). Source: IBFD, own computation. Tax rate on interest income realized by residents of country from debt holdings in country in year , taking into account withholding taxes in country . In percentage points. Source: IBFD, own computation. Tax rate on dividend income received by residents of country from equity holdings in country in year , taking into account withholding taxes in country . In percentage points. Source: IBFD, own computation. Δ Difference between the equally weighted sum of the equity tax rates ( , ) and the capital gains tax yield and the interest tax rate ( ), taking into account withholding taxes in country . Source: IBFD, own computation. Amount of US$ paid in capital gains taxes by residents of country per 100 US$ of equity investment in country based on inflation-adjusted annualized geometric 10-year average price returns. Source: IBFD, own computation from MSCI indices. Amount of US$ paid in dividend taxes by residents of country per 100 US$ of equity investment in country based on inflation-adjusted annualized arithmetic 10-year average dividend returns. Source: IBFD, own computation from MSCI indices. Amount of US$ paid in interest taxes by residents of country per 100 US$ of debt investment in country based on inflation-adjusted annualized 10-year average interest rates. Source: IBFD, own computation from MSCI indices. Δ Difference between the equally weighted sum of the inflation-adjusted equity tax yields ( , ) and the capital gains tax yield and the inflation-adjusted interest tax yield ( ). Source: IBFD, own computation from MSCI indices. _ Amount of US$ paid in dividend taxes by residents of country per 100 US$ of equity investment in country based on inflation-adjusted annualized 10-year average dividend returns, taking into account withholding taxes in country . Source: IBFD, own computation from MSCI indices. _ Amount of US$ paid in interest taxes by residents of country per 100 US$ of debt investment in country based on inflation-adjusted annualized 10-year average interest rates, taking into account withholding taxes in country . Source: IBFD, own computation from MSCI indices. Δ _ Difference between the equally weighted sum of the inflation-adjusted equity tax yields ( _ , ) and the capital gains tax yield and the inflation-adjusted interest tax yield ( _ Percent of total foreign visits of residents of country and country in year with one of the two countries as the destination, demeaned. Source: UNWTO. Percent of total exports and imports of country and country in year that flow between these two countries, demeaned. Source: UNCTAD. 
